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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to summarise on-going research into a new method of providing fault 
tolerant actuators for high-integrity and/or safety-critical applications. The High Redundancy Actuator 
(HRA) project aims to exploit a large number of very small actuation elements to make up a single large 
actuator. This is in contrast to current technology where a relatively low level of functional redundancy is 
used. The HRA elements are configured and controlled in such a way that faults in individual elements are 
inherently accommodated without resulting in a failure of the complete actuation system. The HRA project 
research challenges are outlined and progress to-date is discussed. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Unexpected faults can cost companies large sums of money 
and in extremis can lead to loss of life. In response, modern 
engineering applications demand high levels of availability 
and reliability.  Fault tolerant control is about dealing with 
faults in technical systems (Blanke et al., 2006) and fault 
tolerant systems, which are capable of tolerating component 
malfunctions whilst still maintaining desirable and robust 
performance and stability properties (Patton et al., 1997), 
offer a solution to the availability/reliability problem.  
1.1 Conventional Fault Tolerance 
The majority of research to date has concentrated on sensor 
and system faults, with less emphasis upon the actuators. 
This is attributable to the fundamental differences between 
actuators and sensors. Sensors deal with information, and 
measurements may be processed or replicated analytically to 
provide fault tolerance. However, actuators must deal with 
energy conversion, and as a result actuator redundancy is 
essential if fault tolerance is to be achieved in the presence of 
actuator faults. Actuation force will always be required to 
keep the system in control and bring it to the desired state. No 
approach can avoid this fundamental requirement. 
The common solution (see e.g., Pratt 2000) is to use some 
form of over-actuation in which the fault-free system has 
more control action than needed. This is usually achieved by 
straightforward replication of the actuators, e.g. 3 or 4 
actuators are often used in parallel for aircraft flight control 
systems. In this approach, each actuator must be capable of 
performing the task alone and possibly of overriding the other 
faulty actuators. This over-engineering incurs penalties as 
cost and weight are increased and subsequently efficiency is 
reduced. It also cannot deal easily with lock-up (fail-fixed) 
faults. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The HRA concept 
1.2 The High Redundancy Actuation Approach 
The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) concept is a 
fundamentally different approach to actuator fault tolerance, 
inspired by biomimetics. A muscle is composed of many 
individual muscle cells, each of which provides a minute 
contribution to the force and the travel of the muscle. These 
properties allow the muscle, as a whole, to be highly resilient 
to individual cell damage. The HRA project aims to use the 
same principle of cooperation to provide intrinsic fault 
tolerance. To achieve this, a high number of small actuator 
elements are assembled in parallel and in series to form one 
highly redundant actuator (see Figure 1). Faults within the 
actuator will affect the maximum capability, but through 
robust control full performance can be maintained without 
either adaptation or reconfiguration. The intention is that by 
careful design for specific applications it should be possible 
to provide actuators that gracefully degrade, and that continue 
to operate at the desired level of performance in the presence 
of multiple faults in the actuator elements. Moreover, through 
the appropriate integration of health monitoring methods it 
should be possible for the actuator to identify that it is getting 
close to performance limits by giving an online ‘fitness’ 
assessment (e.g., 90% capability).  
 
 
     
 
1.3. Potential Benefits & Research Challenges  
Three significant benefits of the HRA approach have been 
identified:  
improved availability: it can do its job when asked and will 
warn maintainers when it starts to approach a critical level of 
faults; 
improved efficiency: in terms of actuator sizing (over sizing) 
for fault tolerance; 
graceful degradation: if fault levels exceed the critical 
point, system failure will not be sudden and unexpected. 
However, it is not clear-cut that the high-redundancy 
actuation approach can provide an effective and appropriate 
engineering solution, principally because it involves 
significant complexity (in the actuator and associated control 
system) to provide the required redundancy.  Possibly this is 
why the approach has not been considered seriously before, 
but modern control design and real-time processing 
capabilities now make its feasibility more likely. 
The main challenges identified fall in the areas of actuator 
design and configuration, control, health monitoring, 
demonstration (case studies) and identifying suitable 
technologies for the HRA.  All but the latter are being 
addressed by the current project, and progress in each area 
will be summarised in sections 2-6. 
2. CONFIGURATIONS AND DESIGN METHODS 
Compared with a conventional fault tolerant actuation 
approach it is clear that the HRA improves efficiency by 
using a greater number of smaller actuation elements.  For 
example, a system with ten elements may still work with only 
eight of them operational, and the overall capacity is only 
over-dimensioned by 25% (as compared to 100% or 200% 
for conventional duplex or triplex redundancy).  However, 
for any given application, it is not immediately clear how 
many elements will be needed and in what configuration they 
should be in order to meet particular performance and 
reliability specifications. Weight and size constraints further 
complicate the design.  The basic configuration variants 
being considered in the project are shown in Figure 2. 
Two recent developments that can help the design process 
are: the notion of capability and the use of this in a 
probabilistic framework in order to calculate actuator 
reliability.  These are discussed briefly below. 
2.1  Capability & Reliability 
A high redundancy actuator consists of many elements, and 
so it is possible that some of these elements are operational 
and some are faulty. In this situation, the actuator may still 
work, albeit with reduced performance. Hence, the reliability 
of a high redundancy actuator depends on the required 
performance. A way to capture this connection between 
performance and reliability was introduced in (Steffen et al., 
2008) and is further developed in (Steffen et al., 2009).  
Series in Parallel
(SP) configuration
Parallel in Series
(PS) configuration  
Fig. 2. Two basic 4x4 HRA configurations 
The idea is to determine “capabilities” that describe the 
performance of the high redundancy actuator in terms of 
physical measures. For example, the force capability q, can 
be specified in multiples of the force of an individual 
actuation element. Obviously, using two elements in parallel 
creates an actuator that can produce twice the force, so the 
force capability is q = 2. If one of the elements fail so that it 
cannot generate any force, the capability is reduced to q = 1. 
(If one element locks up, both elements are rendered 
unusable, and series alternatives have to be found.). 
The other important measure is the travel capability d, which 
states how far the actuator can move. Using several elements 
in series increases the travel capability. The force and travel 
capabilities follow similar laws, but for different 
configurations and faults, as shown in Table 1.  The fault 
modes are considered to be independent of one another, so 
that the capabilities can be analysed one at a time.   
Table 1.  The duality of force and distance 
 
The actuator reliability depends on all required capabilities, 
and thus they need to be considered together. The function 
showing the reliability for a required capability is called a 
capability distribution. This statistical tool is able to 
efficiently assess different designs of HRA against a given 
reliability requirement.  The detailed method for generation 
of the capability distributions is given in (Steffen et al. 2008). 
In sum, using probability distributions, the problem can be 
solved with a low computational effort, and using well 
understood operations. 
 
 
 
     
 
2.2 Reliability Examples 
Application of the proposed reliability to the 4x4 Series in 
Parallel (SP) configuration of Figure 2 yields two sets of 
results. for travel and force (Figure 3).  Clearly, this 
configuration deals better with lock-up faults (loss of travel) 
than with loose faults. The corresponding results for a 
Parallel in Series (PS) configuration are identical, except that 
the capabilities are reversed. 
 
Fig. 3  Graphs showing the probability of the HRA failing to 
reach the desired capability level vs the probability of a 
single element fault (top – for distance capability, bottom – 
for force capability). 
In the above analysis, the area of most interest is the bottom 
left corner (i.e. engineers generally chose reasonably reliable 
elements, with a low probability of fault).  Figure 4 shows the 
results having zoomed into this area (for travel). It is clear 
that for requirements in terms of capability at levels of one, 
two or three out of four the HRA is doing better than a single 
equivalent large actuator.  The results also show that the 
selection of the configuration has a significant influence on 
the reliability of the high redundancy actuator and that the 
optimal configuration for a given problem can be found by 
comparing the graphs. By starting with subsystems of parallel 
elements, the actuator can be made more resilient against loss 
of force faults, as other elements can easily take up the load. 
On the other hand, building on elements in series is superior 
in the case of loss of travel (lock-up) faults. 
 
Fig. 4  Close-up of Fig. 3 (bottom), bottom left corner 
3. CONTROL CHALLENGES 
There are many open questions associated with control of an 
HRA. For example, is it possible to control such an array of 
actuators? If so, how? Can a robust approach be used or is 
reconfiguration necessary?  Finally, if model-based control is 
to be utilised, how does the designer cope with the very high 
order control models concomitant with the HRA approach? 
In Section 3.1, the modelling and model reduction 
approaches used will be summarised and recommendations 
made.  Experimental results for control of a 2x2 electro-
mechanical HRA will be presented and discussed in Section 
3.2, demonstrating that classical approaches can be used 
successfully to control a HRA. Finally, in Section 3.3, the 
trade-offs between passive fault tolerance (robust control) 
and active fault tolerance (reconfiguration) will be discussed 
using results from a simulation of a 4x4 electromagnetic 
HRA. 
3.1 HRA Model Complexity 
HRA model complexity presents a real problem for model-
based control approaches (see e.g., Du et al., 2007).  For 
example a mn ×  HRA with 3-states for each element would 
have at least mn ××3  states. Such high-order models lead to 
controllers that are difficult to design and implement.  
Moreover, due to the repeated dynamics of each sub-actuator 
element, there can be uncontrollable and unobservable 
subspaces, further complicating the controller design. There 
are three main ways  to deal with the complexity of the 
system. 
1. Small changes are introduced into the model 
parameters. This removes the repeated dynamics and 
resulting controllability issues but it does not change the 
model-complexity issue. 
2. Model reduction (either using physical understanding or 
formal mathematical methods such as Balanced 
Truncation) addresses both the model-complexity and 
repeated dynamics. 
 
 
     
 
3. A design method can be used that focuses on the 
element level, such as decentralised control design. An 
example would be use of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) 
inspired controller as will be considered in Section 3.3. 
 
The latter two approaches have been found to work well in 
practice and are used in the designs discussed below. 
 
3.2 Experimental Results for a 2x2 HRA 
Experiments have been conducted to determine the effect of 
three types of fault on the 2x2 HRA shown in Figure 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Side view of the experimental HRA (at full extension) 
Two different control designs were considered – in order to 
see how significant the control structure (classical approach) 
is to the degree of passive fault tolerance.  Figure 6 shows the 
two control structures applied and figure 7 shows a typical set 
of step responses in the fault-free case and with three types of 
fault (motor open and closed circuit faults, plus lock-up). 
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Fig. 6. Control structure of a single global position controller 
(top) and of both global and local current controllers (bottom)  
It can be seen from Figure 7 that the control scheme results in 
zero tracking-error in steady-state (due to the integral action). 
This is the case for both schemes. It is the rise time and 
settling time that are most affected by the faults. Hence, the 
tables and figures in Figure 8 quantify the degradation in step 
response by analysing the change in rise time and settling 
time in percentage terms relative to the fault free case.  This 
allows comparison of the two different control schemes 
described earlier.  In both cases, it can be concluded that the 
lockup fault has the strongest effect on the HRA performance 
and it is clear that the structure with inner-loop current 
controllers is affected less than the simpler voltage driven 
system in terms of its settling time, whereas the rise time 
effects are similar with both control structures. 
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Fig. 7. Typical step responses – showing degradation due to 
faults 
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Fig. 8. Performance degradation, in terms of the rise and 
settling time, after three kinds of fault are injected. 
The results summarised above were obtained using the 
controllers described in (Du et al. 2008) and, along with other 
results on LQG control (see Du 2008), they demonstrate the 
feasibility of the HRA approach for improving system fault 
tolerance without the need for reconfiguration. 
3.3 Passive versus Active Control with Electromagnetic HRA 
In this section results obtained from a simulation of an 
electro-magnetic HRA are presented.  The aim is to obtain an 
indication of the possible benefits available from using 
reconfiguration.  The HRA to be controlled, comprising 16 
elements, is shown in Figure 9.  
Two controllers are considered, one passive and one active.  
Passive fault tolerance is attained using a robust controller, 
designed using H∞ loop shaping, which reduces the influence 
of element faults on the closed-loop behaviour. This approach 
can lead to high order controllers, but in this case it is 
 
 
     
 
straightforward to reduce the controller to two states, without 
a significant loss in performance.  The active approach uses a 
Multi-Agent System to control, detect faults and reconfigure 
the control laws accordingly.  This Multi-Agent Control 
(MAC) scheme can be thought of as allowing local multiple-
model control and fault detection on an individual element 
level.  Full details of the HRA simulation model and both 
control approaches can be found in (Davies et al 2009a).   
The structure and level of complexity in the two controllers is 
starkly different. The robust passive controller is simple. 
After the state reduction it takes the form of a single PI plus 
phase advance (PA) compensator acting on the global load 
position error, and the single control input signal, u, is fed 
directly to each of the 16 elements of the HRA. 
Fault 2Fault 1
 
Fig 9.  4x4 Parallel in Series HRA, including location of 
lock-up faults. 
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Fig 10.  Multi-Agent Control and monitoring scheme. 
 
Fig 11.  Agent architecture. 
In contrast, the MAC scheme has four agents each of which 
controls and monitors one of the four parallel columns of 
actuators (as shown in Figure 10).  These all receive their 
local set-points from a global PI+PA controller.  As indicated 
by Figure 11, each agent has a set of four multiple model 
controllers and set-point scaling factors which are applied 
based on the communicated current fault status of the HRA.  
The most severe fault case is known to be lock-up (see results 
in Section 3.2). Hence, both controllers are tested with two 
levels of lock-up – i.e, lock-up of the entire first parallel 
connection, then in the second parallel connection (as shown 
in Figure 9).  The step response results with both controllers 
are compared in Figure 12. 
 
Fig 12. Step response of robust controlled and multi-agent 
controlled HRA in the fault free case and after one and two 
lock-up faults. 
The results show that both the robust control and the MAC 
approaches provide fault tolerance to lock-up faults within a 
HRA. The robust control is simple to implement, however 
there is a slight difference in closed loop behaviour between 
the performance under nominal and one fault conditions. This 
deviation may be tolerable in a real application. However, in 
the case of two lock-up faults, the difference in the closed 
loop behaviour becomes more pronounced, and may not be 
acceptable. For the MAC it can be seen that nominal 
behaviour can be restored after faults have occurred (within 
the mechanical limits of the system). However, this 
advantage is gained in exchange for reliance on fault 
detection and a more complex control structure. 
4. MONITORING 
A key feature of the HRA concept is that failures in 
individual elements can be inherently accommodated without 
the need for explicit fault detection, isolation and 
reconfiguration.  However, in order to ensure that a HRA can 
be replaced/repaired as the degraded performance gets close 
to a critical capability level, it is essential to have some form 
of health monitoring. There are two approaches being 
considered to provide this. 
Monitoring of individual sub-actuator elements:  
development of detection methods for specific faults within 
the individual actuator elements. Within a MAC framework 
simple rule-based methods can be used to assess that an 
element is working or not, as used in the approach discussed 
in Section 3.3 (see also, Davies et al 2009a). Or for greater 
insight of the faults a multiple model approach could be used 
 
 
     
 
(see Davies et al 2009b).  Alternatively the outputs and inputs 
can be collected during experiments and system identification 
approaches can be used (see e.g. Dixon & Pike 2002) to 
detect changes in the physical parameters of the sub-
actuators.  Each of these areas is being explored. 
Overall health monitoring: What is actually needed is a 
quantitative measure for the available performance capability.  
This can be deduced from the number of identified faults in 
the system (i.e. building on the approaches discussed above).  
Alternatively, instead of looking at the individual elements, it 
is also possible to observe the overall system, and directly 
assign a “health level”.  This might be based on parameter 
estimation for a simplified model similar to that of an 
individual actuator.  
6. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
6.1  Current Status – Design, Control & Monitoring 
Configuration/design methods:  tools for analysing the 
configurations in terms of capability and reliability have been 
developed.  These were discussed and demonstrated in 
section 2 and provide a means to evaluate HRA 
configurations in order to meet specified levels of capability 
and reliability.  These tools facilitate the outline design of 
HRA structures. 
Control: one of the key difficulties for control is the model 
complexity.  This can be dealt with by design of controllers 
for each element (breaking down the problem – as in the 
MAS approach), or by producing a reduced order model on 
which to base a single design.  It has been demonstrated that 
an HRA can be controlled using passive approaches; that is, 
by relying on robustness in a fixed controller to deal with the 
faults in sub-actuator elements.  However, it has also been 
shown that post-fault performance can be improved (or 
maintained close to nominal levels) if an active approach is 
permitted.  The benefits come at the cost of increased 
complexity – which may be undesirable in many safety 
critical applications.  The next steps in this area are to extend 
the experimental results to a 4x4 lab-scale actuator and to test 
in simulation at very high element levels (>100).  The results 
will then need to be aggregated to provide design 
rules/processes for HRA designers. 
Monitoring: work in this area is still in its early stages. 
Results have been found using simple rules and a MAS 
approach, but as in the control case the complexity and 
additional sensors may render this less attractive than other 
approaches (possibly data-based) at the HRA-level.  It is 
clear that monitoring will be critical to the overall HRA 
concept. 
6.2  Future – Demonstration, Case Studies & Technology 
In order to demonstrate the above concepts in an 
experimental context the project has already developed a 2x2 
electro-mechanical demonstrator (Figure 5).  At the time of 
writing a 4x4 electromagnetic HRA is being designed using 
elements from SMAC – it is intended that simulated 
operational loads will be applied to this HRA via an 
electromechanical loading system.  The final element of the 
demonstration will be a simulator that can emulate very high 
levels of HRA elements (>100). 
Once the capability, reliability, control and monitoring 
approaches are all in place, it will be necessary to apply them 
to realistic engineering examples - in order to demonstrate the 
efficacy of the HRA approach.  Three case studies have been 
identified for this: a rail-vehicle tilt actuator, a flight surface 
actuator and an inlet guide vane actuator (for aero gas 
turbines).  The experimental results and the output of the case 
studies will be discussed in future papers. 
Once the outcomes described above are in place.  The authors 
anticipate that the viability of the HRA as a concept will have 
been proven. Beyond this, the main challenge will be in 
looking for serious applications and identifying suitable 
technologies from which to develop and manufacture the 
actuators.  Of course, this will open up new technology-
specific issues. 
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